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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
occasions. In Yarborough v. The North Carolina Park Commission'8
it was decided that private property might be taken by eminent domain
even for aesthetic purposes if for a public use. The court here is re-
ferring to the taking of land to create state parks, thereby preserving
the scenic beauty of the state. It is doubtful that this case would sup-
port the taking of property on which there was a building which did not
constitute a hazard to the public safety, health, morals or welfare, and
selling that property to a third party for his private use. In MacRae
v. Fayetteville,9 an attempt was made to enforce an ordinance pro-
hibiting building a service station within 250 feet of a residence within
the corporate limits of Fayetteville. The court held that "the law does
not allow aesthetic taste to control private property, under the guise of
police power."20 The court in a later case, deciding that an ordinance
restricting the height of walls in the city of Greensboro was valid, said:
"[W]hile esthetic considerations are by no means controlling, it is not
inappropriate to give some weight to them in determining the reasonable-
ness of the law under consideration."'2
1
The Court in allowing the police power to be used for aesthetic con-
siderations seems to be leaving the door open to many abuses. This
decision will undoubtedly lead to a great deal more litigation before it is
finally determined, if ever, just what aesthetic considerations will be
allowed.
PAUL B. GUTHERY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Validity of Adoption Statute-Requirements
Concerning Religion of Child and Adoptive Parents
A recent Massachusetts case, Petitions of Goldman,' upheld the
constitutional validity of a statute2 which said that whenever practicable,
the judge in making orders for adoption, "must give custody only to
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child." In the prin-
Is 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
"198 N. C. 51, 150 S. E. 810 (1929).
20 Id. at 54, 150 S. E. at 812.
1 In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N. C. 51, 57, 197 S. E. 706, 710 (1938) ; appeal
dimnissed, Parker v. City of Greensboro, N. C., 305 U. S. 568, 59 S. Ct. 150 (1938).
'- Mass. -, 121 N. E. 2d 843 (1954) ; cert: denied, 348 U. S. 942 (1955).
This case might have been appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to 62 STAT.
929 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (1953).
2 MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1953) : "In making orders for adoption,
the judge when practicable must give custody only to persons of the same re-
ligious faith as that of the child. In the event that there is a dispute as to the
religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its mother.
"If the court, with due regard for the religion of the child, shall nevertheless
grant the petition for adoption of a child proffered by a person or persons of a
religious faith or persuasion other than that of the child, the court shall state
the facts which impelled it to make such a disposition and such statement shall
be made part of the minutes of the proceedings."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cipal case the lower court found that the petitioners, who were Jewish,
were morally and financially qualified to bring up the twins, whose
mother and "natural father" were Catholic. The court also found that
there were many fine Catholic families in the area who had filed applica-
tions for adoption with the Catholic Charities Bureau. Therefore, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the petitions on the grounds that it was
practicable, within the meaning of the statute, to grant the custody of
the children only to persons of the Catholic faith.
The subject matter of this note is confined largely to the con-
stitutional aspects of this problem under the Constitution of the United
States.3 It is now well settled law that the religious guaranties con-
tained in the First Amendment 4 are incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
The court in the Goldman case held that the statute in question did
not effect an establishment of a religion as all religions were treated
alike, no sect was subordinated to another, no burden was placed on any
religion for the maintenance of another, nor was the exercise of religion
required. To the argument that the statute interfered with the mother's
constitutional right to determine her children's religion6 the court said:
"she seems to have consented rather than commanded and seems to have
'been interested only that the babies were in a good home' . . ." and
concluded that there was clearly no interference with the mother's wish
so long as she retained her status as a parent.
It is a well recognized principle that parents have a fundamental
right to rear their children in a particular religious faith.7 However,
there are certain limitations on the free exercise of religion in this area.
Thus where a child distributed religious literature in violation of a
child labor statute;8 where a father sent his child to a private school
which had no secular instruction ;9 or where a parent, for religious
ISee Note, 54 COL. L. Rv. 376 (1954) for a thorough and detailed analysis
of the cases and statutes relating to religion as a factor in adoption, guardianship
and custody.
" "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U. S. CONsT. AMEND. I.
' "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.... ." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U. S. 245 (1934).
' Petitions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d 843, 846 (1954). The
children were born in a hospital from which the petitioners took them. The
mother of the twins never saw the petitioners, but she knew they were Jewish.
The mother gave her written consent to the adoption prayed for.7 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 167 (1943); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534 (1925) ; Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 857, 85
N.Y.S. 2d, 682, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
8 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1943).
'Shapiro v. Dorin, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Dom. Rel. 1950). The
only subjects taught to the children were the Bible, the Talmud, and elementary.
Jewish law. , ,
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reasons, refused to provide his child with medical necessities,'0 the
states have intervened to protect the child's welfare.
In the foregoing cases, the court felt that state intervention was
necessary to protect the child's welfare. It is submitted that in the in-
stant case, the mother's consent to the adoption of the twins by persons
of a different religious faith was not the type of parental action which
so affected the children's welfare as to warrant the intervention by the
state under its police power."
The second aspect of this problem deals with the "establishment
of religion" clause of the First Amendment which the Supreme Court
has said means at least this:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which will aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor in-
fluence a person to go to or remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any re-
ligion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious or-
ganizations or groups and vice versa."' 2
Thus, a state may not permit religious teachers of various faiths to
use its classrooms, during school hours, to teach religion to children
who are compelled by law to attend school;13 nor may the state condi-
tion probation of a delinquent child on church attendance,' 4 because "the
First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which
must be kept high and impregnable."' 5
However, government need not be hostile to religion. Thus, it has
been held constitutional for a state to reimburse parents of public,
private, and parochial school children for bus transportation to and from
school;16 to release children from public school to attend religious in-
"0 People v. Pierce, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903) (criminal prosecution
against a member of the Christian Science faith for not -providing necessary med-
ical treatment of his minor daughter).
"See PFEFFRr, CHURCH, STATE AND FaEzom 587 (Boston: Beacon Press,
1953).
'2 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1946).
"
3McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
"Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 355, 38 S. E. 2d 444 (1946).
' McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1946). The Court held that
the statute did no more than to provide a program for getting all children, re-
gardless of religion, safely to and from schools.
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structions in their various faiths off school property ;17 and to permit
the reading of verses from the Old Testament and the reciting of the
Lord's Prayer to public school children for the purpose of teaching them
piety, justice, and truth.'8
It is submitted that religion should be one of the factors taken into
consideration in the determination of whether a particular person may
adopt a particular child. If the child has reached the age where he has
become aware of religion and religious differences, his welfare, which
should be protected by the state, demands that a conflicting religious
doctrine not be imposed by adoption. Clearly this would not effect the
establishment of a religion, because all religions would be treated alike.
However, if, as in the Goldman case, the child has not reached the age
of religious awareness, it would seem that little or no emphasis should
be placed on the religious aspect of the child's welfare.19 In the prin-
cipal case the court held that even though the children had not been
baptized20 and were too young to choose a religion, their religion was
Catholic.2
1
17 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) ; Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 857,
85 N. Y. S. 2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
" Doremus v. Board of Education, 7 N.J. Super. 442, 71 A. 2d 732 (1950),
aff'd, 5 N. J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U. S. 429 (1952).
0 In the Goldman case the court said: "The petitioners have dark complexions
and dark hair. The twins are blond, with large blue eyes and flaxen hair." Pe-
titions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d. 843, 844 (1954). It might be
argued that because of the difference in physical characteristics, it would be in the
best interest of the children that they be adopted by parents with similar char-
acteristics. On the other hand, there is a good argument against taking the
twins away from the petitioners after the twins had been in the petitioners' home
for three years.
"' "A custom has grown up that where a child is once baptized or entered
in any prescribed manner into a church, that the child is to be treated as be-
longing to that churcTi so l6ng as he is a minor. There is no foundation in law
for such a position. The English cases have held that it is for the father to de-
termine the religious education of a child during his minority. American law
generally * * * recognzes both parents as joint guardans of their children. Where
they agree as to the religious education of their children, no question arises, even
if such agreement includes a change of adherence from one religion to another
during the child's minority. * * * The rights of parents in regard to their minor
children has long been recognized, but there is no right in any church to compel
continued adherence. Where the parents disagree as to the religious education of
their children, the court must consider not only whether there was an admission
of the child to any church, but the entire situation. It is important to discover
whether there was an antenuptial agreement, whether the child's admission to the
church was with the knowledge and consent of both parents, the extent to which
the child has received any form of religious education, whether the child has
reached years of discretion and, if so, what preference the child feels * * * and
finally in which environment the particular child is most likely to develop fully
and happily." It re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N. Y. Supp. 355, 359 (1936).
The stress placed upon baptism raises a possibles constitutional objection
in that it tends to "favor claims of custody of children by adherents of those re-
ligions in which faith is determined by baptism as compared with those which
view the child's faith as purely derivative until the child is able to understand
and accept church doctrines." Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 694, 695 (1952).
"1 It will be recalled that the statute in question said-: "In the event that there
is a dispute as to the religion of the child, its religion shall be deemed to be that
19551
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the statute in question does not
violate the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of re-
ligion. However, it would seem that, in the instant case, the statute
interferes with the mother's constitutional right to determine her chil-
dren's religion and that the state should not be allowed to assert that
the welfare of the twins necessitated state interference with that re-
ligious liberty.
HRBERT S. FALK, JR.
Contempt of Court-Failure to Comply With Court Order to Pro-
duce Properties-Inability as Defense
When an individual has failed to comply with a court order re-
quiring him to produce properties, and the court seeks to hold him in
contempt, will his professed inability to obey the court order purge him
of this contempt? Such a case was recently before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, involving an appellant who had been ordered to pro-
duce the records of his grocery business. He explained that he was
unable to obey the court order since the only records he ever prepared
were income tax returns which he no longer possessed, and cash register
receipts which he threw away after rats had gnawed them. The Supreme
Court held the appellant had been improperly cited for contempt since
his uncontradicted testimony showed that he was unable to comply with
the trial court's order.'
It is generally held that a contemner's inability to comply with a
court order is sufficient to purge him of contempt, if he is without fault,
but it is often added that the contemner's inability is no defense where
caused by his own "contumacious" acts.2 The general rule seems quite
of its mother." (Emphasis added) The court said: "We do not attempt to dis-
cuss the philosophy underlying the concept that a child too young to understand
any religion, even imperfectly, nevertheless may have a religion. We have no
doubt that the statute was intended to apply to such children, and that in such
instances the words 'religious faith * * * of the child' mean the religious faith
of the parents, or in case of 'dispute' the faith of the mother." Petitions of Gold-
man, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d 843, 846 (1954).
1 Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 84 S. E. 2d 822 (1954). This able opinion
by Mr. Justice Johnson, after defining direct and indirect criminal and civil
contempts, restates the necessity of an order to show cause in all contempt pro-
ceedings except those for direct criminal contempts.
2 Tucker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, 299 Ky. 820, 827, 187
S. W. 2d 291, 294 (1945) : "Defendants [contemners] are correct and are sustained
by authorities cited that the inability of the contemner, without fault on his own
part, to obey the order holding him in contempt is sufficient to purge him of the
contempt charged. 12 Am. Jur. § 72, p. 438 (1938); Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky.
400. 214 S. W. 791; Allen v. Woodward, 111 Tex. 457, 239 S. W. 602, 22 A. L. R.
1253. But where the contemner 'has voluntarily or contumaciously brought on
himself disability to obey an order or decree, he cannot avail himself of a plea
of inability to obey as a defense to a charge of contempt."' Accord: McCormick
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